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In Montemayor v. Sebright Products, Inc.,1 a perfect storm of
events led to the plaintiff’s devastating injuries and the lawsuit
before the court. The plaintiff, a laborer for VZ Hogs, a familyowned company that raises hogs and produces hog feed, was
seriously injured while attempting to manually relieve a jam in an
extruder manufactured by Sebright Products, Inc.2 The extruder was
used to crush food containers with a hydraulic ram.3 The liquid from
the containers was siphoned off and a hydraulically powered press
(plenum) crushed the containers and pushed them out of through a
discharge chute and into a separate compacting machine. 4
Montemayor was in the machine with another employee, attempting
to relieve a jam, when a co-employee, unaware Montemayor was in
the machine, activated it in an attempt to relieve the jam. 5 That

* Bell Distinguished Professor of Law, Mitchell Hamline School of Law.
1. 898 N.W.2d 623 (Minn. 2017).
2. Id. at 625.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 626.
31
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caused the plenum to descend on Montemayor’s legs, crushing
them. Both legs had to be amputated above the knee.6
Montemayor sued Sebright, alleging that the design of the
extruder was defective and that the warnings on the machine were
inadequate. 7 The district court granted Sebright’s motion for
summary judgment, concluding that the injury to Montemayor was
not foreseeable.8 The court of appeals affirmed.9
On appeal, the supreme court reversed in a four-three decision.
Justice McKeig, writing for the court, framed the case:
In this case, two long-established rules come together. First, in a
negligence case, when the issue of reasonable foreseeability of the
injury is close, it should be decided by the jury. Second, on a motion
for summary judgment, all facts and the inferences arising from them
must be considered in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party.10

In a split decision, the supreme court reversed the court of
appeals. Taking “the evidence and inferences in the light most
favorable to Montemayor,” the court concluded that “reasonable
persons might differ as to the foreseeability of Montemayor’s
injury,” making it “a ‘close case’ in which foreseeability must be
resolved by the jury.” 11 Three justices dissented from that
conclusion.12
Montemayor is yet another in a long line of Minnesota cases
dealing with the issue of foreseeability in tort law.13 The key issue
concerned whether Sebright owed a duty to Montemayor. 14
6. Id. at 627.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 625.
9. Montemayor v. Sebright Prods., Inc., No. A15–1188, 2016 WL 1175089
(Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 28, 2016).
10. 898 N.W.2d at 625.
11. Id.
12. Chief Justice Gildea dissented, joined by Justices Anderson and Stras. Id. at
633–34, 642.
13. See Mike Steenson, The Domagala Dilemma—Domagala v. Rolland, 39
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 633 (2013); Mike Steenson, Minnesota Negligence Law
and the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional
Harms, 37 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1055 (2011).
14. The foreseeability issue may also arise in the court’s consideration of the
breach and proximate cause issues as well, which further complicates the analysis
of torts cases.
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The rough framework for evaluating the duty issue in
negligence cases is relatively clear, at least insofar as the cases
generally require a foreseeable risk of injury to a foreseeable
plaintiff before a duty will be imposed on a defendant. 15 The
variance in foreseeability standards and in the application of those
standards in cases involving summary judgment motions to dismiss
for lack of foreseeability, complicates development of an evenhanded approach to the issue, however. It does seem to be clear that
in “close cases” the foreseeability issue will be for the jury. As
Montemayor illustrates, there is some disagreement about what it
takes for that tag to apply.
Montemayor might be read as just one more example in the
“close cases” line of decisions, or, read more broadly, it might be
seen as an adjustment of the judge-jury relationship that perhaps
portends a softening of the summary judgment hammer that often
precludes resolution of the foreseeability issue by the trier of fact.
This essay examines that issue in detail. The first part analyzes
the legal framework of the majority. The second does the same with
the dissenting opinion. Part three focuses on the “close cases”
rubric. The court’s recent decision in Senogles v. Carlson 16 is
introduced in that discussion. That case is important to the analysis
because, although it involved the duty of a landowner, the court split
along the same lines as it did in Montemayor, with the majority
concluding that the foreseeability of harm to an injured child was a
jury issue. The fourth part considers the question of whether a jury
should be specifically instructed on the foreseeability issue and if
so, what such an instruction might look like. Part five considers the
question of whether foreseeability should be part of the duty
determination. Part six is the conclusion.
1.

THE MAJORITY—THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK

The majority’s analytical path for analyzing the foreseeability
issue was standard.

15 . Doe 169 v. Brandon, 845 N.W.2d 174, 178 (Minn. 2014), quoting
Domagala v. Rolland, 805 N.W.2d 14, 23 (Minn. 2011), quoting 1 J.D. LEE &
BARRY A. LINDAHL, MODERN TORT LAW: LIABILITY & LITIGATION § 3.48 (2d
ed.2003).
16. No. A15-2039, 2017 WL 4273816 (Minn. 2017).
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•

In products liability cases design and warning theories are
separate, but in both cases duty turns on foreseeability of
injury.17

•

Duty is generally a legal question for the court, but if there
is a specific factual dispute over a manufacturer’s awareness
of a risk of injury, the foreseeability issue is for the jury.18

•

The test for foreseeability is whether, given the defendant’s
conduct, “it was objectively reasonable to expect the
specific danger causing the plaintiff’s injury.”19

•

To determine foreseeability, “we look to the defendant’s
conduct and ask whether it was objectively reasonable to
expect the specific danger causing the plaintiff’s injury.”20

•

There is no duty in cases where as a matter of public policy
the connection between the alleged negligent act and the
injury is too remote to impose liability.21

•

“‘[T]he precise nature and manner’ of the injury does not
have to be foreseeable; rather the issue is “whether ‘the
possibility of an accident was clear to the person of ordinary
prudence.’”22

•

“[A]s a matter of law . . . an injury is not reasonably
foreseeable when the ‘undisputed facts, considered
together,’ establish that the connection between the
defendant’s conduct and the plaintiff’s injury was ‘too
attenuated.’”23

17. Montemayor v. Sebright Products, 989 N.W.2d 623, 629 (Minn. 2017)
(citing Domagala v. Rolland, 805 N.W.2d 14, 26 (Minn. 2011)).
18. Id. at 629 (citing Huber v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, 430 N.W.2d 465,
467 (Minn. 1988)).
19. Id. at 629 (quoting Domagala v. Rolland, 805 N.W.2d 14, 27 (Minn. 2011)).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 629 (quoting Domagala, 805 N.W.2d at 27).
22. Id. at 629 (quoting Domagala, 805 N.W.2d at 27).
23 . Montemayor, 898 N.W.2d at 629 (quoting Doe 169 v. Brandon, 845
N.W.2d 174, 179 (Minn. 2014)).
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•

If “‘reasonable persons might differ as to whether the
evidence’ establishes that the injury was foreseeable,”24 the
court has “consistently submitted the issue to the jury.”25

•

“[I]t is well established that manufacturers can be held liable
despite intervening circumstances—such as an employer’s
comparative negligence, a plaintiff’s failure to heed
warnings, and the disabling of safety devices—if such
circumstances were also foreseeable.”26

The key issue in the case concerned the obligation of the
manufacturer to anticipate the employer’s errors that led to the
assessment of $18,000 in fines for MNOSHA violations. 27 The
violations included improper training in the safe operation of the
equipment involved in the accident; failing to lock out the extruder
prior to attempts by employees to clear the jam, even though the
employer had a written lock out program; and failure of the operator
to verify that all employees were clear of the machine before
starting it.28
In addressing the foreseeability of injury notwithstanding VZ
Hogs’ intervening conduct, the court relied on a trilogy of cases it
perceived to be sufficiently equivalent to justify denying the
defendant’s motion for summary judgment: Parks v. AllisChalmers Corp., 29 Bursch v. Beardsley & Piper, 30 and Bilotta v.
Kelley Co.31
The court placed primary reliance on its opinion in Parks, which
it found to be “strikingly similar on the facts.”32 The plaintiff in that
case was injured while in the process of attempting to unclog a jam

24. Id. at 630 (citing Bjerke v. Johnson, 742 N.W.2d 660, 668 (Minn. 2007));
see also Ill. Farmers Ins. Co. v. Tapemark Co., 273 N.W.2d 630, 636–37 (Minn.
1978).
25. Id.
26. Montemayor, 989 N.W.2d at 630 (citing Germann v. F.L. Smithe Mach.
Co., 395 N.W.2d 922, 925 (Minn. 1986)).
27. Id. at 627.
28. Id.
29. 289 N.W.2d 456 (Minn. 1979).
30. 971 F.2d 108 (8th Cir. 1992).
31. 346 N.W.2d 616 (Minn. 1984).
32. Montemayor, 898 N.W.2d at 630.

36
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caused by corn stalks in his father’s forage harvester.33 The supreme
court held that the defendant could have anticipated that machine
users would manually unclog the machine because it did not provide
a mechanical means of unclogging it; that it could also foresee that
the machine would be unclogged while the power was connected;
and that it would involve an operator handling corn stalks close to
whirling feed rolls, which were accessible through a chute door
which could be opened with the power on due to the absence of a
safety lock interlock device that would have prevented the door
from opening while the power was on.34 The court concluded that
“[t]he jury could find that defendant knew, or in the exercise of
reasonable care should have known, that some users would leave
the power connected while unclogging.”35
The second case was Bursch v. Beardsley & Piper. 36 The
plaintiff, a foundry worker at the DeZurik foundry, was seriously
injured while operating a core-making machine at the foundry when
his right hand and forearm were crushed and burned as he attempted
to align the parts of a core-box. 37 The accident was due to a
combination of inadequate training of the employees who worked
on the machine, failure of the key employees involved, including
the plaintiff, to read the machine manual, or to follow the safety
procedures in the manual. 38 The plaintiff sued DeZurik, alleging
that Beardsley negligently designed the machine and failed to
provide adequate warnings.39 The jury found for the plaintiff on the
negligent design theory and assigned 76 percent of the fault to
DeZurik, 20 percent to Beardsley, and 4 percent to the plaintiff.
Damages were set at $888,000.40
Beardsley argued on appeal that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in refusing to instruct the jury on superseding cause.41
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Parks v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 289 N.W.2d 456, 457 (Minn. 1979).
Id. at 459.
Id. at 459.
971 F.2d 108 (8th Cir. 1992).
Id. at 110.
Id. at 110.
Id.
Id.
Minnesota’s pattern jury instruction on superseding cause reads as follows:
Definition of “superseding cause”
However, a cause is not a direct cause when there is a superseding cause.
A cause is a superseding cause when four conditions are present:
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The Eighth Circuit held that it was not error for the trial court to
refuse to give that instruction because the evidence supported the
conclusion that the intervening actions of the co-employees were
foreseeable to the defendant.42

1. It happened after the original (negligence)(fault); and
2. It did not happen because of the original (negligence)(fault); and
3. It changed the natural course of events by making the result different
from what it would have been; and
4. The original wrongdoer could not have reasonably anticipated this
event.
4 MINN. PRAC., JURY INSTR. GUIDES--CIVIL CIVJIG 27.20 (6th ed. 2014).
42. Bursch, 971 F.2d at 112–13. The court carefully evaluated the actions and
inactions of DeZurik, Bursch, and Bursch’s co-employees in arriving at its
conclusion:
We find no abuse in the present case because the evidence presented
at trial failed to support the conclusion that DeZurik’s negligence was
not reasonably foreseeable. Regarding Bursch’s training, Beardsley &
Piper could have foreseen that Dezurik would not give the manual to
Bursch, Richter, or Burger. The manual was technical in nature and
contained more information than an operator or foreman needed.
Moreover, it was foreseeable that the person training Bursch might not
be familiar with the manual either. Beardsley & Piper’s own expert
admitted that it was common practice in the industry to have existing
operators train new ones.
As to machine maintenance, Beardsley & Piper reasonably could
have foreseen that DeZurik would not maintain the machine in the strict
manner recommended in the operating manual. The environment in a
foundry is extremely abrasive and sand regularly accumulates on
important parts of the core-making machine, including the blowplate.
Beardsley & Piper’s expert acknowledged that some of the manual’s
maintenance instructions—such as check every nut, bolt and screw,
every day—were not to be taken literally and that even with proper
maintenance, valves could still develop leaks.
Beardsley & Piper further argues that even if DeZurik’s negligent
training and maintenance were foreseeable, Richter’s failure to activate
the correct valve was not, and, as such, was a superseding cause of at
least part of Bursch’s injuries. According to Beardsley & Piper, this
conclusion *113 necessarily flows from the jury’s finding in its favor on
the Bursches’ failure to warn claim. We disagree. It certainly was
foreseeable that another employee might attempt to rescue Bursch and it
was also foreseeable that, in the confusion of the moment, the employee
might accidentally activate the wrong valve regardless of how the
controls were labeled. The jury’s finding on the failure to warn claim,
therefore, does not alter the foreseeability of Richter’s mistake.

38
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The majority also relied on Bilotta v. Kelley Co., 43 a case in
which the plaintiff was severely injured when he was pinned at the
neck against a doorjamb by a forklift truck that tipped over at a
loading dock at the warehouse where he worked.44 The warehouse
lessee, Safelite, chose between dock designs, rejecting a design with
a safety device that would have prevented the injury that occurred
when the dockboard shifted. 45 One of the issues in the case was
whether the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on
superseding cause.46 The supreme court held that it did not.47
As in Montemayor, there were OSHA violations by Safelite, but
the court in Bilotta made two important points in rejecting the
argument that those actions were unforeseeable.48 The first was that
an intervening cause cannot be a superseding cause if the
intervening conduct is foreseeable.49 The court initially established
the broad proposition that “OSHA violations cannot be considered
superseding causes which relieve a manufacturer of its duty to
produce a safe product,” 50 but then apparently qualified that
statement by noting that in the specific case the appellant’s quality
control manager wrote an article stating that high employee
turnover made it difficult to ensure that the necessary employee
safety education was being accomplished. 51 The court concluded
that “[c]learly, OSHA violations in these circumstances were
reasonably foreseeable and thus do not constitute [a] superseding
cause. . . . ”52
The second key point was that OSHA violations should not
automatically supersede a manufacturer’s responsibility to design a
safe product. Rather, OSHA violations “are adequately taken into
consideration in the comparative-fault formula.” 53 In fact, as the

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

346 N.W.2d 616 (Minn. 1984).
Id. at 620.
Id.
Id. at 621.
Id.
Id. at 625.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Ruberg v. Skelly Oil Co., 297 N.W.2d 746, 750 (Minn. 1980)).
Id. (citing Minn. Stat. § 604.01 1982)).
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court noted, comparative responsibility was reflected in the jury’s
verdict, which assigned 40 percent of the fault to Safelite.54
The second point appears to return to the broader, less factspecific position on superseding cause. Comparative fault puts
pressure on common law rules that result in all-or-nothing
ameliorative determinations, some of which might work to the
benefit of plaintiffs and some to defendants. The critical point is that
given the application of comparative fault principles, it becomes
less necessary to use superseding cause as an absolute bar when a
third party’s negligence may be taken into consideration, along with
the fault of the product manufacturer.55
The majority in Montemayor saw several undisputed
circumstances that established “that Sebright had, or should have
had, some awareness of the risk of Montemayor’s injury.”56 They
included the fact that Sebright knew that workers would sometimes
enter the extruder to perform maintenance on the extruder, and that
the manual instructions provided a means of unjamming the
54.
55.

Id.
The Third Restatement takes the position that:
Plaintiff’s negligence is defined by the applicable standard for a
defendant’s negligence. Special ameliorative doctrines for defining
plaintiff’s negligence are abolished.” As examples, the ameliorative
doctrines that are abolished include last clear chance and avoidable
consequences. The comments note that comparative fault may also
affect what constitutes a superseding cause, although it acknowledges
that the superseding cause issue is beyond the scope of the comparative
fault Restatement.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 3, cmt. c
(Am. Law Inst. 2000) cmt. c. The Reporters’ Note explains:
Rules of legal cause and scope of liability are beyond the scope of this
Restatement. Nevertheless, comparative negligence may have an effect
on those rules, especially when they are based on a judgment that the
egregious culpability of an intervening cause relieves an earlier, less
culpable actor from liability. This all-or-nothing approach is undermined
by the premise of comparative responsibility: that the factfinder should
compare on a sliding scale the responsibility of all actors who caused an
injury. Rather than totally absolve an earlier cause under a rule about
superseding causes, the factfinder could just adjust the percentages
assigned to the parties. . . Thus, the underlying premise of comparative
responsibility may affect those doctrines. Nevertheless, they are beyond
the scope of this Restatement.
Id. cmt. b, Reporters’ Note (citations omitted).
56. Montemayor, 898 N.W.2d at 631.

40
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extruder from the control panel. 57 While the trial court found it
unforeseeable that there would be simultaneous use of the two
methods of unjamming the extruder, the majority noted that the
machine was designed so the control panel could be relocated, but
without instructions that it should be placed to permit operators to
see the dangerous parts of the extruder.58 The court concluded that
a reasonable person could find that Sebright should have foreseen
the possibility that the extruder would be operated from the control
panel while a worker was in the extruder.59 Finally, the court noted
the disagreement among the experts on the foreseeability of the
accident.60
Because it was a “close case,”61 the majority held that it had to
be resolved by the jury, rather than the court.62 In so holding the
opinion rejected the dissent’s declaration that it was making “bad
law”:
[T]his
result
is
consistent
with
our
longstanding
precedent . . . Moreover, a jury may ultimately find that
Montemayor’s injury was not reasonably foreseeable, that Sebright
was not negligent, or that others were. And manufacturers may still
avoid the burden of going to trial when the evidence does not present
a factual dispute or a “close case” for the factfinder to resolve. But
this is a close case. Were we to end it, we would have to “weigh facts
or determine the credibility of affidavits and other
evidence.” . . . That role is properly reserved for the jury.63

57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 631–32.
60. Id. at 633.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. The court specifically noted that it did not intend to alter the standards
applicable to motions for summary judgment:
We agree with the dissent that the “close cases” standard does not
change our summary judgment standard for questions of foreseeability.
It merely reinforces the notion that, in determining whether a dispute of
material fact exists, all inferences arising from the evidence must be
resolved in favor of the nonmoving party. . . In other words, a case is
“close” not only when the evidence presents an explicit dispute of
material fact, but also when “reasonable persons might draw different
conclusions from the evidence.”
Id. at 629 n. 3.
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THE DISSENT—THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK

Justice Gildea opened her dissenting opinion with this
broadside:
The circumstances of this case are both disturbing and tragic. But it
is not reasonable, as a matter of law, common sense, or public policy,
to expect a manufacturer to foresee—absent any admissible
evidence—that the safety device it installed on the machine would
be disabled and that an employer would violate multiple safety
regulations in using the machine. As the district court said, “bad facts
can lead to bad law.” The facts of this case are most certainly bad,
and the majority has written bad law. Because the majority has
written bad law, I respectfully dissent.64

The dissent’s framework for analyzing the duty issue was
roughly similar to the majority’s:
•

“‘[T]he duty to exercise reasonable care arises from the
probability or foreseeability of injury to the plaintiff.’”65

•

“Whether a manufacturer owes a duty is ‘a question of law
for the court—not one for jury resolution.’”66

•

The manufacturer’s duty is to design “‘a reasonably safe
product.’”67

•

The manufacturer has a duty to warn if it is foreseeable “‘ to
the manufacturer that the product would be used in a
dangerous manner,’”68 but there is no duty to “‘warn of an
improper use that could not have been foreseen.’” 69

The dissent’s analysis of the controlling authority differed from
the majority’s. The dissent took as its text the court’s opinion in
64. Id. at 633–34.
65. Id. at 634 (quoting Domagala v. Rolland, 805 N.W.2d 14, 26 (Minn. 2011)).
66. Id. (quoting Germann v. F.L. Smithe Mach. Co., 395 N.W.2d 922, 924
(Minn. 1986)).
67. Id. (quoting Bilotta v. Kelley Co., 346 N.W.2d 616, 624 (Minn. 1984)).
68. Huber v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, 430 N.W.2d 465, 467 (Minn.
1998).
69. Montemayor, 898 N.W.2d at 634. (quoting Frey v. Montgomery Ward &
Co., 258 N.W.2d 782, 788 (Minn. 1977)).

42

MITCHELL HAMLINE L.J. PUB. POL’Y & PRAC.

[39

Huber v. Niagara Machine & Tool Works 70 in analyzing the
foreseeability issue. In that case an employer was injured when his
foot hit an unguarded foot switch on a punch press he was
operating.71 The employer failed to comply with OSHA regulations
in ensuring that the proper point of operation safety devices were
operable on the foot switch.72 The dissent emphasized the court’s
holding in that case that the manufacturer could not reasonably
foresee that the employer would fail to comply with the OSHA
regulations, and that as a consequence the manufacturer “had ‘no
duty to insure the use of such safety devices’ and ‘no duty to warn
about possible dangers of failing to provide proper point of
operation safety mechanisms.’”73
Applying Huber, the dissent concluded “that Sebright had no
duty as a matter of law . . . because it was not reasonably
foreseeable that VZ Hogs would fail to comply with OSHA
regulations covering the safe operation of the extruder.”74
Huber is a little more complicated than that, however. The
plaintiff in that case, an employee of the R & M Manufacturing Co.,
suffered a serious injury to his hand while operating a punch press
manufactured by Niagara Machine and Tool Works. 75 The press
was equipped with a foot pedal manufactured by Allen Bradley
Co.76 The injury occurred when the plaintiff’s foot slipped and came
down on the activating pedal while he was straightening a warped
piece of metal in the press. 77 The machine came with protective
safety devices on all sides of the pedal, but sometime before the
accident the front guard had been removed.78 The plaintiff had been
warned not to operate the press with his hands in the die area.79
There was a warning to the same effect on the machine.80

70. 430 N.W.2d 465 (Minn. 1988).
71. Id. at 466.
72. Id. at 467.
73. Montemayor, 898 N.W.2d at 635–36 (quoting Huber v. Niagara Machine
& Tool Works, 430 N.W.2d 465, 468 (Minn. 1998)).
74. Id. at 636.
75. Huber, 430 N.W.2d at 466.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
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Huber brought suit against Niagara and Allen Bradley, alleging
various theories, including negligent design of the press and foot
switch and failure to warn of dangers associated with the machine.81
The claim against Allen Bradley was reduced to failure to warn
only. Allen Bradley moved for summary judgment on that theory.
The trial court granted the motion.82 The court of appeals reversed.83
The supreme court reversed the court of appeals.84
The issue was whether a component manufacturer has a “duty
to warn users of its product that safety devices permanently attached
to the product should not be moved and that extra safety
precautions—which are the responsibility of the user’s employer,
not the component manufacturer.”85
The majority distinguished Huber in a footnote, primarily
because that case involved a manufacturer of a component part,
noting that the case was carefully limited the those facts and that the
court in Huber, stating that “‘[t]his reasoning does not conflict with
our prior decisions establishing that the manufacturer of a finished
product has a duty to warn ultimate users of dangers presented by
its product and this duty may not be delegated to an
intermediary.’”86
In part two of its opinion the Montemayor dissent carefully
sifted the evidence in concluding that there was an insufficient
factual dispute to justify withholding summary judgment. The court
found no factual disputes in the expert reports because the plaintiff’s
report simply made a conclusory statement that Sebright should
have been able to foresee VZ Hogs’ failure to train its employees.87
The lack of a factual basis for the opinion, which was set out in a
letter to the plaintiff’s attorney, was labeled inadmissible hearsay,
leading the dissent to conclude that there was no evidence of
foreseeability.88
In summary, there is less of a disagreement about the controlling
legal standards than the application of the standards to the specific
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
n.2).
87.
88.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 466-67.
Montemayor, 898 N.W.2d at 631 n. 4 (quoting Huber, 430 N.W.2d at 468
Id. at 637.
Id. at 638–40.
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facts of the case. That focuses more sharply the key dispute in the
case, one in which both the majority and dissent carefully examined
the evidence in determining whether there was a sufficient question
to conclude that it was a “close case” that justified submission of
the foreseeability issue to the jury.
3.

CLOSE CASES

In Doe v. Brandon, 89 a 2014 decision involving the issue of
whether a church district council should have foreseen the sexual
misconduct of a volunteer minister when it renewed his credentials,
the supreme court held that the trial court did not err in granting
summary judgment to the district council. The issue was whether
the minister’s conduct was foreseeable.
In cases involving harm caused by a third person to the plaintiff,
a defendant owes no duty to guard against that harm unless there is
a special relationship between the defendant and the plaintiff (or
between the defendant and the third person), or if the defendant
creates a foreseeable risk of injury to the plaintiff.90 In an opinion
written by Justice Lillehaug, the court in Doe resolved that issue in
favor of the defendant, noting, in a footnote, that Minnesota case
law states, without explanation, “that in close cases, foreseeability
as it relates to duty is a jury question.”91
As the court noted in Doe, the provenance of the “close cases”
statement is unclear. The dissent in Montemayor pegs it to Lundgren
v. Fultz, in 1984.92 In Senogles v. Carlson, decided a little over two
months after Montemayor, Justice Lillehaug doubled down on the
“close cases” language in concluding that the foreseeability issue is
for the jury. 93 One of the issues in Senogles was whether a
landowner should have foreseen the potential risk to his four-yearold grandchild who nearly drowned while a visitor at a family party
on property that abutted the Mississippi River.94
89. 845 N.W.2d 174, 178 (Minn. 2014).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 178 n.2.
92. 354 N.W.2d 25 (Minn. 1984).
93. Senogles v. Carlson, 902 N.W.2d 38, at 43 (Minn. 2017). Justice Anderson
emphasized in his dissent that this does not change the basic summary judgment
standard. Id. at 49–51.
94. Id. at 43. The court initially acknowledged that a landowner owes a duty of
reasonable care to entrants on land, see Peterson v. Balach, 199 N.W.2d 639
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The defendant moved for summary judgment. The trial court
granted the motion because the injury to the child was not
foreseeable. The court of appeals affirmed, but on the grounds that
the danger was obvious to a child.95 The supreme court reversed.
The court first declined the defendant’s invitation “to adopt a
categorical rule that the danger of swimming unattended in any
Minnesota river, lake, or pool is necessarily obvious to all children,
no matter how young and inexperienced.” 96 Then, because there
were disputed facts concerning the child’s experience and opposing
inferences that could be drawn as to whether he appreciated the
danger in returning to the river after having swum there earlier, the
court held that the obviousness issue was for the trier of fact.97
That left the issue of whether the injury was foreseeable to the
defendant, even assuming that the danger presented by the water
was obvious. The court noted the dissent’s argument98 that it was
unforeseeable as a matter of law that the child would be unnoticed
when he walked back to the river, 99 but rejected it because “any
parent of a mobile 4-year-old child will understand the proclivity of
young children to wander off quickly to pursue whatever curiosity
intrigues them,” and “the opportunity to wander existed because the
children were playing in an unfenced area away from the adults.”100
The court concluded that the facts and the reasonable inferences

(Minn. 1972), but then ramped the duty down, running it through the pinch point
in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343A (1965), which focuses first on whether
a danger is obvious to an entrant and second, if it is, whether injury to the entrant
is foreseeable notwithstanding the obviousness. Id at 42.
95. Senogles v. Carlson, No. A15–2039, 2016 WL 3659314, at *3 (Minn. Ct.
App. July 11, 2016) (“We conclude that Carlson did not owe a duty to Shawn to
protect him from the danger of the river because the danger of the river was open
and obvious to Shawn”).
96. Id. at 47.
97. Senogles v. Carlson, 902 N.W.2d 38, at 48. The defendant urged the court
to adopt “a new rule of law that a Minnesota landowner owes no duty of care to
a child entrant if the child enters the land accompanied by a parent or guardian,
no matter how foreseeable the harm.” The court rejected the argument. Id. at 48.
98. Id. at 52 (“Given the voluminous case law recognizing the obviousness of
the danger of water, the risk of the Mississippi River was obvious to an
objectively reasonable child of 4 years and 8 months”).
99. Id. at 54 n.13.
100. Id.
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from them make the issue of foreseeability a close one to be decided
by a jury.101
Senogles becomes an important complement to Montemayor in
determining the substance of the “close case” tag. If a “close case”
determination is simply a proxy for a determination that there is an
issue over which reasonable minds might differ, it does not change
the basic approach to summary judgment motions based on a lack
of foreseeability.
The Montemayor dissent did not see it that way. The dissent’s
perception is that the majority’s statement that summary judgment
is inappropriate even when there is no explicit factual dispute, if
reasonable minds could differ based on the inference to be drawn
from those facts, is simply wrong.102 The essence of the criticism
appears to be that the majority split what was a unitary standard into
two separate elements.
It is not clear that was the majority’s intent. It appears not so
much to be suggesting a “new rule,” as a different way of viewing
“old law” in summary judgment cases where the issue is
foreseeability of harm. The key part of the majority opinion, the
“new rule,” is its statement that even absent “an explicit factual
dispute in the record,” the foreseeability issue still is for the jury
because the case is a “close case” where “reasonable minds might
differ” on that issue. Inferences are difficult to separate from the
underlying facts that support them and, as the court has consistently
recognized, the law does not favor one form of evidence over the
other, nor should it when the question is whether reasonable minds
can differ on an inference as opposed to the underlying facts that
may or may not support the inference. That seems to be all the
Montemayor majority is saying. 103 Senogles reinforces that view.
The Montemayor/Senogles “close case” view seems to require
nothing more, but, very importantly, it also seems to require nothing

101. Id. at 48.
102. Montemayor v. Sebright Products, Inc., 898 N.W.2d 623 at 640 and n.7.
103 . The court’s reference to Ill. Farmers Ins. Co. v. Tapemark Co., 273
N.W.2d 630, 637 (Minn. 1978) appears to establish that the court is referring to
the inferences that may be drawn from established facts. Montemayor v. Sebright
Products, Inc., 898 N.W.2d 623 at 629.
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less. A motion for summary judgment should not be a substitute for
a trial.104
The cases effectively push the summary judgment barometer to
increase the pressure to find foreseeability a jury issue when either
the direct facts and/or inferences to be drawn from those facts are in
dispute, with Montemayor/Senogles providing rough factual
guidelines for making that determination.105
4.

SHOULD THE JURY BE INSTRUCTED ON FORESEEABILITY?

In “close cases” the court has held that the foreseeability issue
is for the jury, but it has not provided further guidance on the issue.
A pair of 1969 Minnesota Supreme Court decisions written by
Justice Rogosheske clearly state that a party requesting a jury
instruction on foreseeability should be entitled to that instruction if
it is timely made.
In Lommen v. Adolphson & Peterson Construction Co., 106 a
case involving an injury sustained by the plaintiff in a construction
accident when he fell from scaffolding when a handhold the
defendant’s employees had installed came loose. The jury found for
the plaintiff and the trial court entered judgment for the plaintiff. On
appeal, the supreme court affirmed, rejecting the defendant that the
injury was not foreseeable as a matter of law. The court also rejected
the defendant’s argument that the jury should have been instructed
on foreseeability. That claim was rejected because the defendant did
not specifically request a foreseeability instruction and held that the
trial court’s instruction to the jury based on the pattern jury
instruction on negligence full and fairly stated the applicable law.
The court also stated that under the circumstances of the case, “a
trial court would have been well advised to grant it to aid the jury’s
understanding of the defendant’s theory of the case.”107
In Berry v. Haertel,108 a city employee went to the defendant’s
store to buy hay for use on a city construction project. While there,
he was injured when he fell through a wooden floor while obtaining
104. See C.O. v. Doe, 757 N.W.2d 343, 350 (Minn. 2008); Bixler v. J.C. Penney
Co., 376 N.W.2d 209, 215 (Minn. 1985); Utecht v. Shopko Dep't Store, 324
N.W.2d 652,653 (Minn. 1982); Olson v. Kozlowski, 311 N.W.2d 851, 852 (Minn.
1981).
105. See the Appendix.
106. 168 N.W.2d 673 (Minn. 1969).
107. Id. at 677.
108. 170 N.W.2d 558 (Minn. 1969).
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the hay. Following entry of judgment on a jury verdict for the
plaintiff, the defendant appealed, arguing in part that the trial court
should have instructed the jury on his theory of the case, which
emphasized the foreseeability of the risk and his notice of a
dangerous condition. The supreme court rejected the argument
because the defendant did not specifically request the trial court to
give that instruction. The court also stated that “the trial court might
have been well advised to give such an instruction had defendant
properly requested,” while also noting that the instruction given on
the duty of a possessor of land to business invitees accurately stated
the law.109
Neither Berry nor Lommen involved specific requests by the
defendants for a foreseeability instruction, but the court suggests
that such an instruction would be appropriate if requested. If the
foreseeability issue is the key to the case, and central to the defense,
is there any reason why the jury should not be instructed on the
issue? An instruction on foreseeability and a special verdict
question on the issue could be decisive. If a jury found a particular
risk to be foreseeable it would proceed to consider whether the
defendant was negligent in creating that risk. If the jury found that
the risk was not foreseeable that would be the end of the case.
Montemayor/Senogles does not specifically state that there
should be a jury instruction on foreseeability, but the court in
Senogles does seem to indicate that foreseeability is a separate issue,
perhaps antecedent to, the breach and proximate cause issues, when
it stated its conclusion that the defendant was not precluded “from
arguing to the jury that, because he understood that Shawn was to
be supervised by others, [he] could not foresee the danger to
Shawn, . . . was not negligent, or [that his actions] were not the
proximate cause of Shawn’s injury.”110 Montemayor suggests the
same, in noting that “a jury may ultimately find that Montemayor’s
injury was not reasonably foreseeable, that Sebright was not
negligent, or that others were.”111
If a jury is instructed on foreseeability, the next issue is what
standard should be applied to the issue. There are varying

109.
110.
111.

Id. at 562.
Senogles v. Carlson, 902 N.W.2d 38, at 48.
898 N.W.2d at 633.
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formulations in the Minnesota cases.112 A standard that has recently
gained currency113 is the formulation in Whiteford ex rel. Whiteford
v. Yamaha Motor Corp., which states the standard as “whether the
specific danger was objectively reasonable to expect, not simply
whether it was within the realm of any conceivable possibility.”114
The Civil Jury Instruction Guides suggests a more general
standard, if there is to be an instruction on foreseeability. In
brackets, to ensure that it will not be a rote instruction in a
negligence case, it provides that:
An injury is foreseeable if a reasonable person in the same or similar
circumstances would have foreseen it. The exact way an injury
occurred does not have to be foreseeable.115

The correlative special verdict question, the first one in a
negligence case, would ask whether the injury to the plaintiff was
foreseeable to the defendant. An affirmative answer would prompt
the jury to answer the breach of duty issue.
Of course, in taking the position that foreseeability is a question
for the jury, it could be that the court really means only that the
breach issue, including foreseeability, is a jury issue. The pattern
jury instruction on negligence says nothing about foreseeability, but
nothing prevents argument on that issue, as noted in
Montemayor/Senogles.
5. SHOULD FORESEEABILITY EVEN BE
PART OF THE DUTY DETERMINATION?
Courts often say that duty is a question of law for the court and
because foreseeability of risk is a predicate, that question has to be
first resolved by the courts to determine whether a duty exists. No
foreseeability, no duty. But what happens if foreseeability is
removed from the duty determination?

112 . See Mike Steenson, Minnesota Negligence Law and the Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm, 37 WM. MITCHELL
L. REV. 1055 (2011).
113. Id. at 1102.
114. 582 N.W.2d 916, 918 (Minn. 1998).
115 . 4 MINN. PRAC., JURY INSTR. GUIDES—CIVIL, CIVJIG 25.10 (6th ed.
2014).
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Section 7 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for
Physical and Emotional Harm provides that “An actor ordinarily has
a duty to exercise reasonable care when the actor’s conduct creates
a risk of physical harm.”116 It removes foreseeability from the duty
determination and places it squarely in the breach issue. 117 The
intent of section 7 in removing foreseeability from the duty
determination is to clarify the role of courts and juries.
Foreseeability is an essential part of the breach determination. The
consequence is that courts may be more likely to defer to juries for
resolution of the foreseeability issue, rather than effectively trying
a case in order to decide whether an injury is foreseeable.
There are categorical cases in which courts will hold that there
is no duty. In products liability cases, for example, a court may hold
as a matter of law that as a general proposition a prescription drug
manufacturer’s duty is owed only to the prescribing physician and
not to the general public. 118 Or, as in Senogles, the court might
reject a suggested categorical rule on duty, as it did in refusing to
adopt “a rule that the danger of swimming unattended in any
Minnesota river, lake, or pool is necessarily obvious to all children,
no matter how young and inexperienced.”119
According to the Restatement, a no duty determination is a
purely legal question that liability should not be imposed on a

116 . RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND
EMOTIONAL HARM § 7 (a) (Am. Law. Inst. 2010). Subpart (b) accounts for
limitations on liability: “In exceptional cases, when an articulated countervailing
principle or policy warrants denying or limiting liability in a particular class of
cases, a court may decide that the defendant has no duty or that the ordinary duty
of reasonable care requires modification.” Id. § 7(b).
117. Section 3 provides that:
A person acts negligently if the person does not exercise reasonable care
under all the circumstances. Primary factors to consider in ascertaining
whether the person's conduct lacks reasonable care are the foreseeable
likelihood that the person's conduct will result in harm, the foreseeable
severity of any harm that may ensue, and the burden of precautions to
eliminate or reduce the risk of harm.
Id. § 3.
118. Id. at cmt. i. For two examples of courts adopting the Restatement and
removing foreseeability from the duty determination, see Thompson v.
Kaczinski, 774 N.W.2d 829 (Iowa 2009); A.W. v. Lancaster County Sch. Dist.,
784 N.W.2d 907 (Neb. 2010).
119. 902 N.W.2d 38 at 47.
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certain category of potential defendants. The comments explain
further:
Such a ruling should be explained and justified based on articulated
policies or principles that justify exempting these actors from
liability or modifying the ordinary duty of reasonable care. These
reasons of policy and principle do not depend on the foreseeability
of harm based on the specific facts of a case. They should be
articulated directly without obscuring references to foreseeability.120

The Restatement points out that in “conducting its analysis, the
court may take into account factors that might escape the jury’s
attention in a particular case, such as the overall social impact of
imposing a significant precautionary obligation on a class of
actors.” 121 Foreseeability is not included. 122 Where “reasonable
minds could differ about the competing risks and burdens or the
foreseeability of the risks in a specific case . . . courts should not use
duty and no-duty determinations to substitute their evaluation for
that of the factfinder.”123
There are cases where a court may conclude that there is no
breach of duty as a matter of law, however. In those cases, however,
it is clear that the determination is based on the specific facts of a
case, rather than principle or policy. Those decisions lack the
precedential value of categorical decisions on the duty issue,
however, and should be understood as such.
The dissents in Montemayor and Senogles almost seem to be
doing that in concluding that the plaintiffs’ injuries were not
foreseeable, but if that analysis is effectively a breach analysis, a
question arises as to why the dissents’ interpretation of the facts and
inferences drawn from those facts should trump the views of jurors
on the issue. The dissents illustrate the reason why the Restatement
eliminated foreseeability from the duty determination.
Taking the position of the Restatement is not far removed from
what the court effectively accomplished in Montemayor and
Senogles, however, by a tightening in the application of summary
judgment standards.

120. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND
EMOTIONAL HARM § 7, cmt. i (2010).
121. Id.
122. Id. at cmt. j.
123. Id.
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With Montemayor/Senogles, a “rule” effectively emerges
stating not quite that an employer’s intervening actions can never
be a superseding cause, but that it will be extremely difficult to
establish that it is on a motion for summary judgment.
CONCLUSION
The closeness of the decisions in Montemayor and Senogles
effectively highlights a difference not so much in the basic legal
standards that apply in resolving motions for summary judgment
that argue a particular injury is not foreseeable as it does in a
difference in judicial attitudes toward the role of judge and jury in
making that determination. Even if the legal standards are not
altered in the cases, the summary judgment envelope has certainly
been pushed to make it more likely that summary judgment will not
be granted in these sorts of cases.
In Foss v. Kincade,124 a 2009 decision, Justice Paul Anderson
suggested that “in most cases the question of foreseeability is an
issue for the jury.”125 That part of Foss was questioned by Justice
G. Barry Anderson in Domagala v. Rolland,126 who also noted that
close cases should be resolved by the jury, but also, citing Alholm
v. Wilt,127 an innkeeper’s liability case, that foreseeability is more
properly resolved by the court.128
One might wonder whether the court has now effectively
returned to the court’s observation in Foss.

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

766 N.W.2d 317 (Minn. 2009).
Id. at 322–23.
805 N.W.2d 14, 27 n.3 (Minn. 2011).
394 N.W.2d 488, 491 n.5 (Minn. 1986).
Domagala, 805 N.W.2d at 37 n.3.
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APPENDIX
THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT METER
Any number of cases could be placed on the summary judgment
meter. The closer the facts of the case to Montemayor, the more
likely that summary judgment on the basis of foreseeability will be
denied. The closer to Huber, the more likely the motion will be
granted. This is obvious, but I liked the graphic.
Montemayor/Senogles

Parks

Bilotta

Huber

SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
BAROMETER
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